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No. 92
The Social Security Administration’s Office of
the Actuary has officially “scored” the Individual
Social Security Investment Program Act (HR
530), introduced by Reps. Sam Johnson (R-TX)
and Jeff Flake (R-AZ). That legislation is based on
the Cato Institute’s 6.2 Percent Solution. (There
are slight differences between the Cato plan and
the final draft of the legislation, but these would
not significantly change the scoring.)
According to SSA’s actuaries, the 6.2 Percent
Solution would eliminate Social Security’s long-
range actuarial deficit and restore the system to
permanent “sustainable solvency.” The legislation
compares very favorably to other Social Security
reform plans. In terms of giving workers more con-
trol and ownership of their retirement funds, the
6.2 Percent Solution clearly provides the most
“bang for the buck.” By 2046, the system would
begin running surpluses, allowing any short-term
debt to be repaid. Indeed, by the end of the 75-year
actuarial window, the system would be running
surpluses in excess of $1.8 trillion (in constant
$2005).
The SSA analysis shows that the 6.2 Percent
Solution can provide large individual accounts
while restoring Social Security to permanent
sustainable solvency, and can do so in a fiscally
responsible manner. 
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Introduction
On February 17, 2004, the Cato Institute
published “The 6.2 Percent Solution: A Plan
for Reforming Social Security,” a comprehen-
sive proposal for creating privately invested,
individually owned accounts as part of an
overall reform of the Social Security system.1
Under this proposal, workers under the
age of 55 would have the option of diverting
their half of the Social Security payroll tax
(6.2 percent of wages) to individual accounts.
The employer’s portion of the payroll tax
would continue to be paid into the Social
Security system to provide survivors’ and dis-
ability benefits, as well as to partially fund
continuing benefits for those already retired
or nearing retirement. Workers choosing the
individual account option would forgo any
future accrual of Social Security retirement
benefits. However, those workers who have
already paid into the current Social Security
system would receive credit for accrued bene-
fits in the form of a recognition bond. This
fully tradable bond would be a zero-coupon
note that would mature on the date of the
recipient’s normal retirement age. 
Workers who do not choose the individ-
ual account option would continue to pay
into and receive benefits from the current
Social Security system. However, for those
workers, the initial Social Security benefit
formula would be adjusted to reflect price
indexing rather than the current wage index-
ing.2 The result would be to restore Social
Security benefits to a level payable with
Social Security’s available revenue, while
ensuring that future retirees continue to
receive the same level of benefits as those
retiring today, on an inflation-adjusted basis.
(This change would be phased in over a 35-
year period, beginning in 2014.)
The plan also called for establishing a
new minimum Social Security benefit pro-
viding a significant increase over the current
minimum benefit. 
This proposal became the basis for legisla-
tion introduced on July 19, 2004, by Rep. Sam
Johnson (R-TX), along with 18 original
cosponsors.3 Johnson, together with Rep. Jeff
Flake and 10 cosponsors, reintroduced the bill
in the 109th Congress, on January 21, 2005.4
The legislation was submitted to the Social
Security Administration for official scoring as
to its impact on the federal budget and Social
Security solvency. On February 15, 2005, the
SSA’s Office of the Actuary (OACT) issued its
report, concluding that the Johnson-Flake bill
would restore Social Security to permanent,
sustainable solvency.5 The results of OACT’s
report are reflected below. 
(There are slight differences between the
Cato plan as originally written and the Johnson
bill. These are noted where relevant, but would
not significantly change the scoring.)
Scoring Assumptions
Scoring of the 6.2 Percent Solution was
done using actuarial assumptions consistent
with the 2004 report of the Social Security
Trustees. While there were minor changes in
methodology between that report and the
2005 Trustees Report, most major demo-
graphic and economic assumptions (includ-
ing fertility rates, death rates, immigration,
productivity, inflation, wage-covered employ-
ment, unemployment, and Trust Fund inter-
est rates) remained the same.6 Therefore, the
scoring results are likely to remain substan-
tially consistent with the new report (the com-
parisons herein use Social Security assump-
tions from the 2005 Trustees Report).
In scoring the proposal, OACT did make a
number of specific assumptions that affected
the final outcome. Among these:
Although the Cato plan calls for a default
portfolio of 60 percent stocks and 40 percent
bonds (and the Johnson bill calls for a default
portfolio of 65 percent stocks and 35 percent
bonds), OACT nevertheless scores the bill
using a 50/50 stock/bond portfolio. They
base their decision on an assumption that,
since both the Johnson-Flake bill and Cato
plan would eventually completely replace
Social Security’s defined benefit with a
2
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defined contribution system, workers would
be inclined to move their investments away
from the default portfolio and into a more
conservative one.7
The rates of return estimated for the invest-
ments were assumed to be 6.5 percent for equi-
ties, 3 percent for government bonds, and 3.5
percent for corporate bonds.8 Although this is
slightly below the historic return on equities, it
is reasonable given evidence of a declining risk
premium.9 Administrative costs are estimated
to be 25 basis points (one quarter of 1 percent
of assets managed).
OACT assumes that workers make their
decision as to whether to participate in the
individual account option on a more or less
rational basis. That is, if they will receive high-
er benefits from the traditional Social Security
system (as adjusted for wage/price indexing),
they will remain in the current system. If they
can do better under individual accounts, they
will choose them. Approximately 10 percent of
workers age 54 are expected to choose individ-
ual accounts, with 100 percent participation
among those age 40 and younger. Those
between the ages of 54 and 40 participate in
gradually increasing amounts.10
Differences between
the Cato Plan and 
the Johnson-Flake Bill
There are some small differences between
the original Cato plan and the Johnson bill as
introduced. These include the following:
• Additional Contributions. Under the
Cato plan, workers would be allowed to
contribute an additional 10 percent of
their wages to their accounts on a vol-
untary basis. However, under the pro-
posed legislation, there are no provi-
sions for additional contributions to
the individual account.
• Recognition Bonds. The Cato plan called
for the face value of the recognition
bonds to be calculated by applying the
existing Social Security benefit formula
(AIME/PIA) to the workers past covered
earnings. The actuarial present value of
this accrued-to-date benefit would then
be calculated using a discount rate equal
to the long-term opportunity cost of
funds to the government (essentially the
30-year bond rate), or roughly 3.5 per-
cent, and current age- and gender-spe-
cific expected mortality rates. The Cato
plan also envisioned that “the recogni-
tion bonds may be valued at something
less than the full present value of
accrued benefits,” but did not specify
the methodology for achieving this
reduction. The Johnson-Flake bill uses
the Social Security disability formula to
calculate a worker’s accrued benefits (in
effect, acting as though the worker
became disabled as of the date that the
worker chooses the individual account
option). The value of the bond is slight-
ly reduced by using a 40-year calculation
period in determining the AIME, rather
than 35. 
• Transition Financing. The Cato plan
prescribes three measures for covering
transition costs. First, the plan proposes
redirecting all of the taxes on Social
Security that currently fund Medicare
back to the Social Security program.
Second, Cato has identified $87 billion
in corporate welfare that, if eliminated
from the budget and saved, could be
used to finance the transition. Finally,
the Cato plan notes that any funds
“recaptured” through corporate taxes
before profits go to the investor could
be used to offset the costs of the transi-
tion. The Johnson-Flake bill does not
specify sources of transition financing,
but indicates that general revenue trans-
fers will pay for the transition.11
• Age of Participation. Under the Cato
plan, workers “not currently in the labor
force” must go into the new individual
account system. Under the Johnson bill,
workers under age 22 must go into the
new individual account system. 
• Investment Options. The Cato plan calls
3
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for a default investment option of a 60/40
stock/bond fund. The Johnson-Flake bill
offers a default 65/35 stock/bond fund.
Fiscal Impact of the 6.2 
Percent Solution 
The fiscal impact of Cato’s Social Security
reform plan must be looked at in the context
of Social Security’s current financial status.
According to the intermediate projections of
Social Security’s trustees, the program will
begin running deficits—annual expenditures
exceeding revenues—by 2017, with perpetual-
ly increasing cash shortfalls thereafter
(Figure 1). Those shortfalls reach 4 percent of
payroll within 30 years and rise to more than
6 percent by the end of the 75-year actuarial
period. Thereafter, they continue to grow
outside the actuarial window. Overall, the
deficits total $12.8 trillion on a present-value
basis (using a perpetuity measure).12
Compared to the current system, the 6.2
Percent Solution would increase cash-flow
shortfalls in the short term, but after 2045,
the program’s cash-deficit would be eliminat-
ed and the program would begin running per-
manent surpluses (Figure 2). Indeed, by the
end of the standard 75-year actuarial window,
the system would have accumulated surplus-
es of $1.8 trillion.13 Those surpluses would
continue to grow outside the actuarial win-
dow. In short, under the 6.2 Percent Solution,
Social Security would achieve permanent sus-
tainable solvency. As OACT says, “The pro-
gram would be expected to remain solvent
throughout the 75-year projection period and
for the foreseeable future beyond.”14
As calculated by OACT, the cost of moving
to this system of individual accounts, com-
monly referred to as the transition cost, would
be approximately $6.5 trillion. While at first—
and even second—glance, that looks like a great
deal of money, the current unfunded obliga-
tions faced by Social Security run to $12.8 tril-
lion. In short, the 6.2 Percent Solution restores
Social Security to permanent sustainable sol-
vency—and it does so at roughly half the cost of
preserving the current system. That is, the pro-
posal saves taxpayers some $6.3 trillion.
Another way to see how the proposal
improves system finances is to look at the
burden on future generations as measured by
4
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Social Security’s Payroll Tax Surplus or Deficit
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Source: The 2005 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and
Disability Insurance Trust Funds. 
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Social Security Surplus/Deficit (in constant 2005 billions of dollars)
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Source: The 2005 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and
Disability Insurance Trust Funds. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss and Alice H. Wade to Representative
Sam Johnson, “Estimated Long-Range OASDI Financial Effects of a Proposal for Individual Social Security
Investment Program Act of 2005 (H.R. 530),” February 15, 2005. 
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Figure 3
Social Security Surplus/Deficit (percentage of payroll)
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Source: The 2005 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and
Disability Insurance Trust Funds. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss and Alice H. Wade to Representative
Sam Johnson, “Estimated Long-Range OASDI Financial Effects of a Proposal for Individual Social Security
Investment Program Act of 2005 (H.R. 530),” February 15, 2005. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss to
Representative Paul Ryan, “Estimated Financial Effects of the ‘Social Security Personal Savings and Prosperity
Act of 2004,’” July 19, 2004. 
the level of Social Security expenditures as a
percentage of payroll. As Figure 2 shows,
under the current system, Social Security’s
burden on future taxpayers is expected to rise
from its current 11.13 percent of taxable pay-
roll to 19.08 percent by 2078, and continue
to rise thereafter. However, under the pro-
posed individual account plan, the tax bur-
den peaks at 17.06 percent of payroll in 2028,
eventually declining to just 3.11 percent, an
amount necessary to continue providing sur-
vivors’ and disability benefits. Because at that
point Social Security’s expenditures would be
below anticipated revenues (continuing at
6.2 percent of payroll), funds would become
available to pay back any borrowing incurred
during the transition. 
A further breakdown of the costs of the 6.2
Percent Solution is also informative. Roughly
62 percent of the up-front cost of the proposal
is brought about not by allowing workers to
redirect their payroll taxes to individual
accounts, but because of the redemption of the
recognition bonds.15 In fact, it is the recogni-
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Figure 4
Net Cash Flow from the General Fund of the Treasury to OASDI Trust Funds (infinite
horizon)
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Source: The 2005 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and
Disability Insurance Trust Funds. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss and Alice H. Wade to Representative Sam
Johnson, “Estimated Long-Range OASDI Financial Effects of a Proposal for Individual Social Security Investment
Program Act of 2005 (H.R. 530),” February 15, 2005. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss to Representative Paul
Ryan, “Estimated Financial Effects of the ‘Social Security Personal Savings and Prosperity Act of 2004,’” July 19,
2004. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss, Alice H. Wade, and Chris Chaplain to Representative Jim Kolbe and
Representative Charles Stenholm, “Estimated OASDI Financial Effects of the ‘Retirement Security Act,’” February
11, 2004. Memorandum from Chris Chaplain and Alice H. Wade to Stephen C. Goss, “Estimated OASDI Financial
Effects of ‘Social Security Solvency and Modernization Act of 2003’ introduced by Senator Lindsey Graham,”
November 18, 2003. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss to Representative Jim DeMint, “Estimated Financial
Effects of H.R. 3177, the ‘Social Security Savings Act of 2003,’” September 26, 2003. Memorandum from Stephen
C. Goss and Alice H. Wade to Senator Chuck Hagel, “Estimated Financial Effects of ‘The Saving Social Security
Act of 2005,’” March 10, 2005. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss and Alice H. Wade to Daniel Patrick Moynihan
and Richard D. Parsons, “Estimates of Financial Effects for Three Models Developed by the President’s Commission
to Strengthen Social Security,” January 31, 2002.
Note: Contingent liabilities refers to the cost of benefit guarantees if account investments underperform projections.
tion bonds that cause the sudden large cost
increase that Figure 3 shows beginning in
2018. In this context, it important to under-
stand that recognition bonds cannot in any
way be considered a new cost. They are simply
the prepayment of already accrued Social
Security benefits. An additional 1 percent of
the cost can be attributed to providing the new
minimum benefit.16
“More Bang for Your Buck”
As Figure 4 shows, the 6.2 Percent Solution
is less expensive than other large-account plans,
especially those plans that contain significant
contingent liabilities as a result of guaranteeing
benefit levels. Of course, plans with smaller
accounts have lower short-term costs, but over
the long run the 6.2 Percent Solution achieves
substantially higher savings (Figure 5). 17
Moreover, the 6.2 Percent Solution gives
workers far more ownership and control
than plans with smaller individual accounts.
Indeed, Figure 6 shows that measured in
terms of account size per trillion dollars of
transition cost, the 6.2 Percent Solution
achieves the most “bang for your buck.”
The size of individual accounts—the
amount of payroll taxes that workers are
7
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Social Security Surplus/Deficit
Source: The 2005 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and
Disability Insurance Trust Funds. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss and Alice H. Wade to Representative
Sam Johnson, “Estimated Long-Range OASDI Financial Effects of a Proposal for Individual Social Security
Investment Program Act of 2005 (H.R. 530),” February 15, 2005. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss to
Representative Paul Ryan, “Estimated Financial Effects of the ‘Social Security Personal Savings and Prosperity
Act of 2004,’”July 19, 2004. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss, Alice H. Wade, and Chris Chaplain to
Representative Jim Kolbe and Representative Charles Stenholm, “Estimated OASDI Financial Effects of the
‘Retirement Security Act,’” February 11, 2004. Memorandum from Chris Chaplain and Alice H. Wade to
Stephen C. Goss, “Estimated OASDI Financial Effects of ‘Social Security Solvency and Modernization Act of
2003’ introduced by Senator Lindsey Graham,” November 18, 2003. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss to
Representative Jim DeMint, “Estimated Financial Effects of H.R. 3177, the ‘Social Security Savings Act of
2003,’” September 26, 2003. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss and Alice H. Wade to Senator Chuck Hagel,
“Estimated Financial Effects of ‘The Saving Social Security Act of 2005,’” March 10, 2005. 
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allowed to save and invest—is extremely
important. Social Security reform is about
more than finances. Indeed, if system finances
were the only issue, we could simply raise taxes
or cut benefits. True Social Security reform
must also provide for increased rates of return
and higher benefits, correct the inequities of
the current system so as to treat working
women, African Americans and others more
fairly, and give low-income workers a greater
opportunity to own and accumulate real
wealth. By these measures, large accounts do a
far better job of achieving true reform.
For example, increasing attention is being
paid to the benefits of individual accounts as
a way to give low-income workers an oppor-
tunity to build wealth. While any increase in
wealth should be encouraged, we should also
be honest enough to admit that for low-wage
workers, very small individual accounts, such
as the 2 percent of wages called for under
some proposals, is simply not enough to
allow for the accumulation of a real nest egg. 
You can see the difference by considering
the case of a 22-year-old worker earning
$35,000 per year (the current median wage).
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Figure 6
Bang for Your Buck: Account Size Compared to General Revenue Transfers
Source: The 2005 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and
Disability Insurance Trust Funds. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss and Alice H. Wade to Representative
Sam Johnson, “Estimated Long-Range OASDI Financial Effects of a Proposal for Individual Social Security
Investment Program Act of 2005 (H.R. 530),” February 15, 2005. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss to
Representative Paul Ryan, “Estimated Financial Effects of the ‘Social Security Personal Savings and Prosperity
Act of 2004,’” July 19, 2004. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss, Alice H. Wade, and Chris Chaplain to
Representative Jim Kolbe and Representative Charles Stenholm, “Estimated OASDI Financial Effects of the
‘Retirement Security Act,’” February 11, 2004. Memorandum from Chris Chaplain and Alice H. Wade to
Stephen C. Goss, “Estimated OASDI Financial Effects of ‘Social Security Solvency and Modernization Act of
2003’ introduced by Senator Lindsey Graham,” November 18, 2003. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss to
Representative Jim DeMint, “Estimated Financial Effects of H.R. 3177, the ‘Social Security Savings Act of
2003,’” September 26, 2003. Memorandum from Stephen C. Goss and Alice H. Wade to Senator Chuck Hagel,
“Estimated Financial Effects of ‘The Saving Social Security Act of 2005,’” March 10, 2005. Memorandum from
Stephen C. Goss and Alice H. Wade to Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Richard D. Parsons, “Estimates of
Financial Effects for Three Models Developed by the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security,”
January 31, 2002.
A two percent account would allow the work-
er to accumulate just under $145,000 by
retirement. Four percent accounts, as sug-
gested by President Bush, would double that
to nearly $290,000. However, 6.2 percent
accounts would give the worker more than
$433,000 (Figure 7).18 Given that these Social
Security accounts may often be the only form
of savings that low-income workers have, the
more they are able to save, the better.
Finally, small accounts do little to advance
the fundamental goals of reducing reliance on
government and giving individuals greater
responsibility for and control over their lives.
However, under the 6.2 percent plan, govern-
ment’s role would eventually be limited to pro-
viding survivors’ and disability benefits and
ensuring a safety net that prevents seniors
from falling into poverty. The vast majority of
workers would be saving for their own retire-
ment, taking control over their own lives.
Benefits under the 6.2
Percent Solution 
Opponents of individual accounts fre-
quently suggest that the creation of such
accounts would result in cuts in the
promised level of Social Security benefits. In
doing so, these critics are confusing changes
necessary to restore the system to balance
with changes resulting from individual
accounts. As noted above, Social Security
faces unfunded liabilities of nearly $12 tril-
lion. Quite simply, unless there is a substan-
tial increase in taxes, the program cannot pay
the promised level of benefits. 
That is not merely a matter of conjecture,
but a matter of law. SSA is legally authorized
to issue benefit checks only as long as there
are sufficient funds available in the Social
Security Trust Fund to pay those benefits.
Once those funds are exhausted, in 2041 by
current estimates, Social Security benefits
will automatically be reduced to a level
payable with existing tax revenues, approxi-
mately 74 percent of current benefit levels.19
The gap between promised and payable ben-
efits will continue to grow thereafter, reach-
ing a 32 percent benefit reduction by the end
of the actuarial period (Figure 8).20
Social Security must be restored to a sus-
tainable level regardless of whether individual
accounts are created. The proper baseline to
use when discussing Social Security reform,
9
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therefore, is not benefits as scheduled, but the
level of benefits that Social Security will actu-
ally be able to pay in the future. 
As the Congressional Budget Office has
put it:
A number of recent proposals to reform
Social Security call for changes in the
program’s benefits. The effects of those
proposals are frequently illustrated by
comparing the new benefits to those
expected to arise under the policies put
in place by current law—showing
whether they would be higher or lower
and by how much. However, because of
scheduled changes in benefit rules, a
growing economy, and improvements in
life expectancy, the benefits prescribed
under current law do not represent a sta-
ble baseline. Their value will vary signifi-
cantly across future age cohorts. Thus,
focusing on differences from current law
will not fully portray the effects of pro-
posed benefit changes.21
As scored by OACT, average-wage workers
who are roughly age 45 or younger today
could expect higher benefits under the 6.2
Percent Solution than Social Security would
otherwise be able to pay. Older average-wage
workers would not fare as well and presum-
ably would not choose the individual
account option, though higher-wage workers
would still exceed payable benefits. Low-wage
workers are a special case, since most would
be covered under the new minimum benefit.
However, two assumptions that SSA uses
in scoring the plan lead it to understate the
proposal’s benefits. First, constrained by
Social Security’s accounting rules, the actuar-
ies assume that Social Security will pay full
scheduled benefits until the Trust Fund is
exhausted in 2042, after which benefits
would be immediately reduced by 27 percent
10
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to reach payable levels. But Congress is very
unlikely to allow such an abrupt benefit
reduction. Changes in benefits are much
more likely to be phased in slowly, meaning
that the “payable” baseline would be a much
earlier basis for comparison.22
Second, as mentioned above, SSA scores
the returns from individual accounts assum-
ing a 50/50 stock/bond portfolio mix. It does
this even though the Johnson bill calls for a
default portfolio of 65/35 stocks to bonds.
Substantively, the SSA assumptions result in
the accounts earning approximately 11 per-
cent lower returns than if the default were
used for workers retiring in 2055; that is,
those who would be contributing over their
entire working lifetime. For those retiring
earlier, the differential would be smaller, but
would still matter. 
SSA assumes that workers will transfer
their funds out of the default portfolio in
search of less risky investment options. That
is a debatable assumption. Those low- and
middle-income workers most concerned
about risk are also those least likely to be
involved in the active management of their
portfolios. It seems likely that a large per-
centage would leave their funds in the default
portfolio out of simple inertia. Moreover,
low-wage workers would be substantially
protected from risk through the new mini-
mum benefit. Indeed, many observers have
criticized benefit guarantees precisely be-
cause they encourage workers to take on
additional risk, creating a “moral hazard.” 
If benefits were scored using the default
portfolio, the monthly benefit would, as
noted, be about 11 percent higher than esti-
mated by SSA, making the advantage of indi-
vidual accounts over traditional Social
Security even more apparent (Figure 9). 
Conclusion
Cato’s proposed Social Security reform, as
reflected in legislation by Reps. Sam Johnson
and Jeff Flake, would restore Social Security
to long-term and sustainable solvency, and
would do so at roughly half the cost  of sim-
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Figure 9 
Monthly Retirement Benefits: Present Law vs. 6.2 Percent Solution 
(constant 2004 dollars)
Note: Benefits for one spouse of a two-earner couple (spouse is same age with similar earnings). 
ply propping up the existing program. But it
would also do far more than that. 
Younger workers who chose the individ-
ual account option could receive retirement
resources substantially higher than under
traditional Social Security. At the same time,
it would treat women and minorities more
fairly, and allow low-income workers to accu-
mulate real wealth. 
Most importantly of all, this is a proposal
that would give workers ownership and con-
trol over their retirement income. It is a plan
that is fiscally responsible and protects
future generations of workers and taxpayers.
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